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Case No. 20160321-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain ti.ff/ Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD SIMON GARCIA, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a sentence for aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0) (West Supp. 2016-2017). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion by sentencing Garcia to 
prison rather than placing him on probation? 
Standard of Review. Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ,J8, 40 P.3d 626. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no dispositive constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules at 
issue in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
Midafternoon on 16 September 2014, West Valley City police officers 
responded to an aparhnent in west Salt Lake County, based on a report that 
three intruders were present. R3. Upon entering the apartment, officers 
found a 1nan-who identified himself as Richard Montoya, but who was 
later identified as Defendant-slumped over the kitchen table, and who 
"kept sliding into the wall." Id. Defendant was also drooling, incoherent, 
and unable to stand on his own. Id. Defendant told officers he had taken a 
blue pill that he bought from someone else, but did not know what it was. 
Id. The officers took Defendant to Pioneer Valley Hospital for treatment. Id. 
After the officers left, however, Defendant pulled out an LV. in his arm and 
walked away from the hospital. Id. 
1 Because Defendant pleaded guilty, the facts are taken from the 
statement of probable cause (R3-4), his statement in support of his guilty 
plea (R55-61), the presentence report (187-201), and the sentencing hearing 
(R175-184). The sentencing transcript is attached as Addendu1n A. 
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Later that same day, near 6:00 p.m., Anthony King was at work 
delivering pizzas when Defendant approached King, who was standing 
outside of his car, and asked for a ride. Id. King told Defendant that he 
could not give him a ride because it was against his employer's policy to do 
so. Id. When King tried to get in his car, Defendant slammed the car door 
on King and began hitting him in the face. Id. Defendant "told King it was 
life or his car, so King got out and" Defendant stole King's car, an orange 
Dodge Neon. Id. 
Shortly thereafter, West Valley City officers deployed spikes to stop 
the stolen Neon. R4. Defendant successfully swerved the Neon to avoid the 
first set of spikes. Id. However, when Defendant swerved to avoid a second 
set of spikes, he lost control of the Neon, striking both a wooden power pole 
and a chain link fence. Id. After crashing the Neon, Defendant and his 
female passenger fled on foot, but were quickly apprehended. Id. 
Defendant was again taken to Pioneer Valley Hospital to get treatment for 
injuries sustained in the crash. Id. One of the officers who responded to the 
hospital after the crash hnmediately recognized Defendant as the same 
incoherent man officers had encountered earlier that day, and who had 
falsely identified himself as another man. Id. Further investigation revealed 
that Defendant's driver's license was suspended and that he had active 
-3-
warrants. Id. Defendant's female cohort had drug paraphernalia and a 
knife on her person. Id. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony; failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; 
false information to a law enforcement officer, a class A misdemeanor; 
failure to stop at command of a law officer, a class A misdemeanor; and 
driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license, a class C 
misdemeanor. Rl-3. 
Following plea negotiations, Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony. R55-61; R157-174. Defendant's signed plea 
statement indicated that he "unlawfully and :intentionally took a motor 
vehicle from another person by use of force or fear." R56. The remaining 
charges were dismissed, along with Defendant's charges in two other cases. 
R55; R160. 
The presentence report (PSR) detailed Defendant's extensive criminal 
history, including his poor supervision history. R188,193-197. Three out of 
four times Defendant had been previously granted probation, his probation 
was revoked as unsuccessful. See Rl 93-194. Defendant had also served 
sentences in both state and federal prison. R188. Given Defendant's 
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extensive criminal history, which included two prior violent felonies, and 
his poor supervision history, the PSR recommended the statutory prison 
term of five years to life. R188. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the trial court to 
consider sentencing Defendant "one degree lower to a one to 15." R178. In 
support, counsel argued that Defendant was on the wait list for treatment at 
Odyssey House, that he had been on the wait list for "many months," and 
that it usually takes "nine, 10, 12 months to get into the program.11 Id. 
Defense counsel also argued that Defendant had taken advantage of other 
treatment opportunities, that he was 45 years old and thus "getting to the 
point where most people age out of criminal conduct/' that Defendant was 
remorsefut and that on the day of the aggravated robbery Defendant had 
"taken a medication [Xanax] that he was unaware of/' but that Defendant 
was also "acknowledging responsibility." R178-179. 
Finally, defense counsel acknowledged that Defendant had "a 
substance abuse issue ... for methamphetamine." R179. Although 
Defendant had stopped drinking, and also stopped using tobacco and other 
drugs, he had not stopped using methamphetamine: "That's a difficult one 
to overcome." Id. Accordingly, Defendant wanted to "enter a serious 
inpatient program to address that, which in this case would be at the 
-5-
Odyssey House." Id. Defense counsel pointed out that Defendant had 
"done a fair amount of time in jail on this," and that he "would also do a lot 
more jail before he would even be eligible to go to the top of the list at 
Odyssey House." Id. 
The prosecutor argued that Defendant's history did not show that he 
would be successful on probation, or that any sentence other than a prison 
term "would be appropriate." R179-180. Indeed, the PSR put Defendant 
"firmly in the imprisonment category with the 10 year presumptive initial 
sentence." R180. To the extent Defendant asserted that the aggravated 
robbery here was induced by his drug activity, the prosecutor pointed out 
that "arguably, anything can fall under the header of drug induced 
activity," and that while "there are property crimes that people do in order 
to obtain drugs," Defendant's crimes were "violent felonies" that were 
"[n]ot obviously motivated by any sort of desire for drugs or any desire for 
anything other than to behave violently." Id. Given Defendant's history, 
including the instant aggravated robbery, the prosecutor argued that 
Defendant had shown himself to be "a dangerous individual" who 
represented" a significant threat to society." Id. Accordingly, a prison term 
was "the only appropriate sanction." Id. 
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Defendant also addressed the trial court. R180. Defendant 
acknowledged that he had "a serious problem" with methamphetamine, but 
asked for another chance to address it. Id. Defendant also claimed not to 
remember anything about the aggravated robbery, but emphasized that he 
was "not trying to minimize" his criminal conduct. R181. Rather, 
Defendant argued that "if given one more chance or one opportunity," he 
could "probably become ... a good part of society." Id. Defendant 
acknowledged that probation "would be a serious test" for him, however, 
where he "would be out in the streets where there are other controlled-
where there's other substance is, where whatnot, and that's where you 
really test my-show my-what I want to do with my life and not just sit 
here and give you empty promises." Id. Defendant also acknowledged that 
he had previously been enrolled at school, but that he "just messed up," and 
lost his "place to live." Id. 
The trial court imposed the statutory term of five years to life, and 
imposed restitution in the amount of $10,350 to King, and $13,085.54 to 
Rocky Mountain Power. R182. The trial court understood that Defendant 
wanted another chance at probation, but the court had to "balance" 
Defendant's interests with society's interests. Id. Given Defendant's poor 
history, including the frightening nature of the aggravated robbery where 
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Defendant "found someone, beat him up, and stole his car, ran it into a 
telephone post," the trial court concluded Defendant was "a danger, not 
only to the person [he] beat up, but everybody on the road in between as 
this chase occurred." Id. The trial court thus determined that Defendant 
needed "to be in prison." Id. 
Defendant timely appealed. R140-141. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 
sentencing him to the statutory prison term instead of placing him on 
probation. He broadly argues that the trial court did not adequately weigh 
his desire to conquer his meth addiction and put too much weight on his 
poor supervision history, and the circumstances surrounding the 
aggravated robbery. But on this record, Defendant has not shown-and 
cannot show - that no reasonable sentencing judge would conclude that 
Defendant's repeated failures to change and the violent nature of the 
aggravated robbery warranted imprisonment. 
-8-
'·.-,\ \lifl 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by 
sentencing Defendant to prison rather than placing him on 
probation. 
Defendant does not argue that the sentencing court failed to consider 
any relevant factor. See Aplt.Br.7. Rather, Defendant asserts that the trial 
court did not give enough weight to his "accomplishments while 
incarcerated," his alleged "reentry plan," his desire "to address his meth 
addiction problem, or the fact that he was on a waiting list for Odyssey 
House. Aplt.Br.7. Defendant further suggests that the trial court gave too 
much weight to his poor criminal history and the nature and circumstances 
of the violent aggravated robbery. Id. Defendant has not shown-and 
cannot show - that the court's balancing of these factors was unreasonable 
and rendered the result inherently unfair. 
"A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the 
defendant in light of his background and the crime committed and also 
serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice system." 
State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). That said, the court's 
sentencing decision "necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the 
court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
-9-
Sentencing courts traditionally have "wide latitude and discretion in 
sentencing." State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997). A sentence 
will not be overturned unless the sentencing court bases its decision on 
some wholly irrelevant or improper factor, fails to consider all legally 
relevant factors, imposes a sentence that exceeds statutory or constitutional 
limits, or otherwise rules in a manner so inherently unfair that the sentence 
is an abuse of discretion. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, if 8, 40 P.3d 626; State v. 
Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957); State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, if 3, 
73 P.3d 991. And absent a showing to the contrary, this Court must 
presume that the sentencing court considered all relevant factors and did 
not consider irrelevant ones. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, ,r,rll-12; see also State v. 
Robison, 2006 UT 65, ,J21, 147 P.3d 448 (discussing presumption of regularity 
attaching to court rulings). In short, a sentencing court abuse does not 
abuse its discretion unless "no reasonable [person] would take the view" 
adopted by the sentencing court. State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, if 14, 
82 P.3d 1167 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). 
Moreover, defendants have no right to probation. State v. Mungia, 
2011 UT 5, ,r 24, 253 P.3d 1082. Rather, the sentencing court may grant 
probation in its discretion. Id. That is because the "granting or withholding 
of probation involves considering intangibles of character, personality and 
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attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling." Sibert, 310 P.2d at 
393; accord State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, if58, 191 P.3d 17; see also State v. 
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[T]he discretionary 
imposition of probation rests in many cases upon subtleties not apparent on 
the face of a cold record .... "). Furthermore, these intangibles must be 
"considered in connection with the prior record of the accused," Sibert, 310 
P.2d at 393, along with considerations of "rehabilitation[,] ... deterrence, 
punishment, restitution, and incapacitation," Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051. 
Ultimately, the sentencing court must exercise its discretion in determining 
what it believes "will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with 
the public interest." Id. 
As stated, Defendant does not claim that the trial court failed to 
consider any required factor; rather, Defendant's complaint is that the court 
did not adequately consider factors favorable to him. Aplt.Br.7. In other 
words, Defendant disagrees with how the court assessed and weighed the 
competing factors. But mere disagreement with the sentencing court's 
assessment is not enough. Defendant must show that "no reasonable 
[person] would take the view" adopted by that court. Valdovinos, 2003 UT 
App 432, if14 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). 
Defendant cannot 1nake that showing here. 
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The trial court balanced the various factors weighing for and against 
prison, including Defendant's poor criminal history (including three prior 
revocations of probation and two violent felonies), and the violent nature of 
the instant aggravated robbery. See R182; see also R187-201. The court also 
considered Defendant's admission that he was addicted to 
methamphetamine, as well as his assertions that he was remorseful, that he 
wanted to change and had conquered his other addictions, and that he was 
on the waiting list for Odyssey House. See id. But the court implicitly found 
Defendant incredible. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1988) 
(noting appellate courts give "' due regard ... to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses'" (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a))). It implicitly recognized that Defendant had been given 
opportunities to change in the past-and had squandered them. See R182. 
The court thus concluded that it was time to move beyond probation and 
ilnpose a more significant punishment for Defendant's violent crime: 
Sir, I understand what you're saying, that you would like a 
chance, but at some level I have to balance your interests with 
the society-with society's interests, and I certainly do try that 
in a lot of cases, and I'm willing to go out on a limb in the 
appropriate case. Unfortunately, your history is such that I just 
cannot do that. The nature of this crime is such- if, in fact, it is 
(a] frightening crhne. You found someone, beat him up, and 
stole his car, ran it into a telephone post. You're a danger, not 
only to the person you beat up, but everybody on the road in 
between as this chase occurred. You simply need to be in 
-12-
Q 
© 
Id. 
prison, and your history has shown that. That's what I have to 
impose. 
Given Defendant's poor criminal history, his admitted addiction to 
methamphetamine, the fact that he had yet to be accepted to Odyssey 
House, and the violent nature of the aggravated robbery here, Defendant 
cannot show that no reasonable jurist would have committed him to prison. 
Defendant points to nothing inherently unfair or unreasonable about 
the court's conclusion that he had not earned the right to yet another chance 
at probation-and State-provided inpatient substance abuse treatment-in 
light of all the factors weighing in favor of imprisonment. See Killpack, 2008 
UT 49, if59 ("[O]ne factor in 1nitigation or aggravation may weigh more 
than several factors on the opposite scale." (internal quotation omitted)). 
Nor is the prison sentence rendered an abuse of discretion by virtue of 
Defendant's weighing the factors differently than the trial court. See id. 
'if'jf59-61 (rejecting defendant's claim that mitigating factors considered by 
the sentencing court should have weighed in favor of probation). In short, 
the trial court acted well within its discretion when it determined that 
Defendant was a "danger" to society and needed to be in prison. R182. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on December 13, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MARCH 23, 2015 
JUDGE PAUL B PARKER 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. MACK: Judge, will you call the Richard Garcia 
matter? 
THE COURT: All right. 
(Concludes previous case) 
THE COURT: This is 141910607, State vs. Richard 
Simon Garcia. Mr. Mack for the defendant. Mr. Cooley for 
the State. This is also a sentencing. 
Honor. 
report? 
MR. MACK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you Richard Simon Garcia? 
DEFENDANT GARCIA: Yes, I am, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. What are we doing? 
MR. MACK: This is the time for sentencing, Your 
THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the pre-sentence 
MR. MACK: I do. 
THE COURT: Any corrections or additions? 
MR. MACK: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead then. 
MR. MACK: Your Honor, we have a couple of requests. 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
First is we would ask you to consider sentencing 
Mr. Garcia one degree lower to a one to 15. He is on the 
list for inpatient treatment at the Odyssey House. He's been 
on the list for many months, but it does require almost a 
year usually - nine, 10, 12 months to get into the program. 
He's working his way up that list. That is our first 
request, Your Honor. 
Secondly, if I may approach to - I've shown these 
to Mr. Cooley. 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. MACK: If I can show you what he's been involved 
in while he's been in custody? 
He's taken advantage of any treatment opportunities 
that have been available to him. 
He's 45 years old. He's getting to that point 
where most people age out of criminal conduct. And in this 
case, I know that he has great remorse for his behavior. He 
- and I think there's some mention by his part, but at least 
in the police report, there's some mention of him having 
taken a medication that he was unaware of. 
THE COURT: Xanax? 
MR. MACK: Yes, Xanax. And, in fact, did enter a 
plea in this case, but had very little memory of the 
incident. 
I guess, that's the second reason for - that we'd 
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ask you to consider sentencing in one degree lower. He's 
acknowledging responsibility. He was found in his car, and 
he's not contesting that he did what he's accused of doing, 
but he is saying that under usual circumstances and the 
behavior that he's more recently been involved in, that this 
would not have happened. 
Also, though, he recognizes that he has a substance 
abuse issue. Not for Xanax particularly, but for 
methamphetamine. 
He's been through and quit other substances during 
his life. He's stopped drinking. He's stopped using 
tobacco. He's stopped using other drugs, but he has not 
stopped using or didn't - had not stopped using 
methamphetamine. That's a difficult one to overcome, and he 
is looking, if he could, to enter a serious inpatient program 
to address that, which in this case would be at the Odyssey 
House. 
He's done a fair amount of time in jail on this. 
He would also do a lot more jail before he would even be 
eligible to go to the top of the list at Odyssey House. 
That is our request, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The State? 
MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, the State's joining that 
you keep these recommendations. Nothing in the defendant's 
history suggests that any sent - any other sentence would be 
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appropriate. It maxes out on the sentencing matrix with 
landing firmly in the imprisonment category with the. 10 year 
presumptive initial sentence. 
On top of that, the conduct here - it's - arguably, 
anything can fall under the header of drug induced activity, 
but there are property crimes that people do in order to 
obtain drugs, and then there are the crimes that the 
defendant has committed, which were violent felonies. Not 
obviously motivated by any sort of desire for drugs or any 
desire for anything other than to behave violently. 
One of the cases was dismissed at preliminary 
hearing, but the other, an aggravated burglary, was dismissed 
in exchange for the plea in this case. 
The defendant's history support the prison 
sentence. The defendant's conduct here doesn't say anything 
about drug use. It says the defendant's a dangerous 
individual and represents a significant threat to society. 
Imprisonment is the only appropriate sanction. 
THE COURT: Sir, is there anything you want to say 
to me before I impose sentencing? 
DEFENDANT GARCIA: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like to 
address this. I do have a serious problem. I understand 
that, and I just would be - like to be given one chance to 
address this. 
I know that right before I came in here, I didn't 
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have a problem with amphetamines. And just as Mr. Mack said, 
I don't really recollect anything, but I'm not trying to 
minimize my crime or take anything away from Mr. King. 
I pray every night that I - that what I did to this 
gentleman, this young man, does not affect his life, and I 
just want to - I'd like to address this one last issue. 
I feel that if given one more chance or one 
opportunity, I think that I can probably become a proper - a 
very prosper - or a good part of society. You know, I just 
feel that given - I just - I took a class when I was in a 
federal prison, and I completed it, but that was in a 
controlled environment. I would - I know that a serious test 
would be would be out in the streets where there are other 
controlled - where there's other substance is, where whatnot, 
and that's where you really test my - show my - what I want 
to do with my life and not just sit here and give you empty 
promises. 
I know that given a chance - I was - as I said 
right before I came to jail - about six months before I came 
to jail, I was enrolled to go to Stevens-Henager College, and 
I - just like I say, I just messed up. I lost my place to 
live, and I'm not making excuses for my behavior. I did 
something very terrible that I can never be excused for to 
this young man. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Is the victim 
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here that he would like to speak? 
MR. MACK: He is not. No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. On the first degree felony 
charge, I am going to impose five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison, impose restitution in the amount of $10,350 to 
Anthony King, and $13,085.54 to Rocky Mountain Power. 
Sir, I understand what you're saying, that you 
would like a chance, but at some level I have to balance your 
interests with the society - with society's interests, and I 
certainly do try that in a lot of cases, and I'm willing to 
go out on a limb in the appropriate case. Unfortunately, 
your history is such that I just cannot do that. The nature 
of this crime is such - if, in fact, it is frightening crime. 
You found someone, beat him up, and stole his car, ran it 
into a telephone post. You're a danger, not only to the 
person you beat up, but everybody on the road in between as 
this chase occurred. You simply need to be in prison, and 
your history has shown that. That's what I have to impose. 
DEFENDANT GARCIA: Okay. 
THE COURT: So good luck to you, sir. 
DEFENDANT GARCIA: May I ask for a forthwith, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: A forthwith? Absolutely. 
DEFENDANT GARCIA: Okay, thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. (Concluded) ( 8-5-15) 
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